We quantify the "specialness" of U.S. Treasuries relative to near default-free developed market sovereign bonds by measuring the gap between the swap-implied dollar yield paid by foreign governments and the U.S. Treasury yield. We call this wedge the "U.S. Treasury Premium." We find that the U.S. Treasury Premium was approximately 21 basis points at the five-year horizon prior to the Global Financial Crisis and has disappeared since the crisis with the post-crisis mean at -8 basis points. We argue that the decline in the long-term U.S. Treasury Premium was largely driven by the decline in the liquidity premium component of U.S. Treasuries relative to foreign government bonds. In addition, we present evidence that the relative supply of government bonds in the United States and foreign countries affects the U.S. Treasury Premium.
Introduction
In this paper, we measure and quantify the specialness of U.S. Treasuries as the deviation in covered interest rate parity between U.S. government yields and government bond yields in other developed markets. This measure, which we term the "U.S. Treasury Premium," captures the difference between the swap-implied dollar yield paid by foreign governments and the yield the U.S. government pays to borrow in dollars. The advantage of this measure relative to existing measures of the liquidity and safety premia of U.S. Treasuries is that it captures the extent to which the U.S. government is special as a debt issuer relative to other near-risk-free developed sovereign governments rather than large U.S. agencies or corporates.
We measure the U.S. Treasury Premium vis-à-vis government bonds in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom, referred to as the "G10 countries." Except for Japan, all sample countries have AAA or near-AAA sovereign credit ratings and are perceived to be near default-free by global investors.
1 From 2000-2016, we find the average premium on U.S. Treasuries was 10 basis points at the five-year horizon and 25 basis points at the three-month horizon. The premia differ significantly across countries, ranging between -26 and 61 basis points for the five-year horizon in our sample.
Furthermore, we document a steady decline in the U.S. Treasury Premium at mediumand long-term maturity since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The average five-year premium is 21 basis points pre-GFC and -8 basis points post-GFC. By contrast, the three-month premium averages 20 basis points before and after the GFC. The decline in the medium-and long-term U.S. Treasury Premium is accompanied by a sharp inversion of the term structure of the premia.
To investigate the drivers of the U.S. Treasury Premium, we perform an empirical decomposition of the premium into three components: (1) sovereign credit risk differential between the foreign country and the United States; (2) swap market mispricing given by the deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIP) for interbank funding instruments (Du et al. (Forthcoming) ); and (3) a residual term, which we attribute the difference in the broadly-defined liquidity premium, such as convenience and collateral value.
We show that in the pre-GFC period, both the measured credit spread differentials and CIP deviations were negligible; thus the positive U.S. Treasury Premium is driven almost entirely by the liquidity component. In the post-GFC period, both the CIP deviations for interbank rates and sovereign CDS spread differentials tend to increase the U.S. Treasury
Premium because the U.S. has lower sovereign CDS spreads than the average G10 country and swap market mispricing on average makes the swap-implied dollar yield higher than the direct dollar yield. Therefore, the secular decline in the medium-to long-term U.S. Treasury
Premium is mostly driven by the decline in the liquidity premium U.S. Treasuries.
We then examine the relationship between our U.S. Treasury Premium measure with other existing Treasury liquidity premium measures. At the short horizon, the general collateral (GC) repo-Treasury bill (repo-Tbill) spread is considered a measure of the liquidity premium in Treasury bill yields, as the GC repo is secured by Treasury collateral and has very little credit risk, but is not as liquid as Treasury bills (Nagel (2016) ). We find that variations in the average 3-month premium of U.S. Treasury bills are strongly correlated with the U.S. repo-Tbill spread. When the repo-Tbill spread is high, our average 3-month U.S. Treasury Premium is also high. Furthermore, we find that a higher repo-Tbill spread in foreign countries is correlated with a reduction in U.S. Treasury Premium at the 3-month horizon, which supports the notion that our premium measures the relative liquidity ofU.S.
Treasury bills vis-a-vis foreign Treasury bills.
However, at the medium to long maturity, our U.S. Treasury Premium behaves differently from the conventional liquidity premium measure of the yield spread between near risk-free agencies and Treasuries within the same country. In the United States, a commonly used long-term liquidity premium measure is the difference between the yield on Resolution
Funding Corporation (Refcorp) coupon strips and Treasury strips (Fleckenstein et al. (2014) and Negro et al. (2017) ). Refcorp strips are fully guaranteed by the U.S. Treasuries and thus have the same credit risk as Treasuries. Therefore, the Refcorp-Treasury spread captures the liquidity premium differential between Treasury and Refcorp bonds. We note that contrary to the secular decline in our U.S. Treasury Premium, the Refcorp-Treasury premium actually increases after the GFC. Our results are therefore consistent with the idea that the U.S.
Treasury has lost its specialness vis-a-vis other developed sovereigns, but sovereign debt continues to earn a liquidity premium over safe agency debt.
Finally, we examine how the relative supply of U.S. Treasuries over foreign government bonds affects the U.S. Treasury Premium. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show that the U.S. public debt to GDP ratio is inversely related to the liquidity premium on U.S. Treasuries. When the debt to GDP ratio is low, Treasuries are more scarce and therefore commands a higher premium compared to private paper. Consistent with their results, we find that an increase in the supply of foreign government bonds relative to U.S.
Treasuries is associated with a higher U.S. Treasury Premium.
Our U.S. Treasury Premium measure is related to those of a number papers that examine the convenience yields of U.S. Treasuries, in particular Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) , Nagel (2016) and Greenwood et al. (2015) . Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) examine the effect of the amount of debt outstanding on the liquidity and safety premia of U.S. Treasuries. The authors estimate the premium at 73 basis points, which they identify off of the effect of Treasury issuance on AAA-Treasury spreads. While our benchmark estimates are lower than those in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) , this should not be surprising as we are measuring a different concept. We are considering the U.S. Treasury's liquidity and safety premia relative to other governments rather than relative to safe agencies and corporates. Therefore, one way to interpret our results is to say that the 3 US earns a premium relative to developed sovereigns that is smaller than that earned relative to its own agencies and corporates. Greenwood et al. (2015) estimate the convenience yield of T-bills using the differential between the actual T-bill yield and the fitted yield based on the estimated yield curve, and find a premium of 40 basis points for one-week bills. Nagel (2016) measures the liquidity premium on T-bills as their spread relative to a three-month general collateral repo with the mean premium equal to about 24 basis points.
The question of how much less the US government pays on its debt because of its "specialness" is also related to the question of the "Exorbitant Privilege" and the source of the return differentials between the US and the rest of the world. This question is examined by Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) , Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) , Gourinchas et al. (2010) , and Curcuru et al. (2008) . By converting all foreign government bond yields into U.S. dollars, we contribute to this literature by quantifying the degree to which the U.S. government pays less than foreigners, above and beyond differences in the currency risk premia. Recently, a number of papers in international finance have examined how changes in the relative convenience yield or liquidity benefits of government bonds across countries can help resolve a number of exchange rate puzzles (Valchev (2016) , Engel (2016) , and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) ). Our measure U.S. Treasury Premium provides an empirical counterpart to the shocks in these papers.
In terms of the construction of the U.S. Treasury Premium measure itself, this paper build on the earlier work of Du and Schreger (2016a) and Du and Schreger (2016b) . Du and Schreger (2016a) construct the "local currency credit spread" in an identical way as the measure used in this paper and argue that it larges captures sovereign default risk on nominal debt in emerging markets.
2 The "U.S. Treasury Premium" is constructed the same was as the "local currency credit spread" in these earlier papers but is given a very different interpretation. This is because sovereign default risk is very low in G10 countries, and therefore, it is likely that the factors such as the liquidity premium differential and financial 2 Hofmann et al. (2016) studies this same measure in connection to currency appreciation.
market frictions play more important roles than default risk in explaining the U.S. Treasury
Premium vis-à-vis G10 government bonds. We discuss the difference in the behavior of this measure between emerging and developed countries in Section 3.2. The measure in this paper is closely related to the analysis of "Relative Swap Spreads" in Codogno et al. (2003) . Codogno et al. (2003) decompose yield spreads in euro area countries into international risk factors, default, and liquidity, while accounting for the fact that bonds are in different currencies by using interest rate swaps. Our measure differs from the measure in that paper by including the cross-currency basis swap, but would be the same if this basis was close to zero as was generally the case prior to the GFC. Our analysis is also related to Feldhütter and Lando (2008) and Jermann (2016) who analyze the sources of variations in asset swap spreads for the U.S. Our paper could be recast as analyzing the difference between the U.S.
asset swap spread and foreign swap spreads, net the cross currency basis swap. Finally, as our measure is defined as the size of the failure of CIP between government bond yields, it also relates to the recent literature studying CIP deviations focusing on behaviors of banks and corporate issuers (such as Ivashina et al. (2015) , Liao (2016) , Du et al. (Forthcoming) , and Avdjiev et al. (2016) ).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the methodology behind calculating the premium and our data sources. In Section 3, we present the main results on the behavior of the U.S. Treasury Premium across time, currencies, and maturity. In Section 4, we compare this premium to measures of the liquidity of U.S. Treasuries. In Section 5, we examine the relationship between relative bond supply and the premium. Section 6 concludes.
Methodology and Data

Definition of the U.S. Treasury Premium
In this section, we present the methodology for comparing yields in different currencies.
We follow Du and Schreger (2016a) and use cross-currency swap rates to swap sovereign yields in different currencies into synthetic dollar yields. Then the U.S. Treasury Premium is defined as the difference between the synthetic dollar yields paid by foreign governments and the yield on U.S. Treasuries. A positive U.S. Treasury Premium suggests that the U.S.
government is paying less in real terms than foreign governments, We keep the discussion of currency hedging brief here, but more details and discussions can be found in Du and Schreger (2016a) .
We illustrate the construction of our synthetic dollar yields by taking the Japanese yen 
The first component ρ as the "U.S. Treasury Premium" vis-à-vis Japan, or
More generally, the U.S. Treasury Premium vis-à-vis country i is defined as
where y i nt is the n-year government bond yield in country i and ρ i/U SD nt is the n-year forward premium (or the fixed-for-fixed cross-currency swap rate) for currency i against the dollar.
In order to further decompose this premium, we need to begin by outlining the factors than can affect the prices of U.S. Treasuries and foreign government bonds.
Decomposition of the U.S. Treasury Premium
In this subsection, we provide a simple theoretical decomposition of the U.S. Treasury Premium defined in Equation 2.
Price of a U.S. Treasury Bond
Given a U.S. Treasury bond at t + 1, let L * t+1 denote the default loss and Λ * t+1 the liquidity benefit. Then the price of a one-period U.S. Treasury bond is given by
and the yield on the U.S. Treasury is
whereỹ * t is the hypothetical dollar risk-free rate, l * t is the default premium, λ * t is the liquidity premium, and ξ t is the covariance between liquidity and default risk.
If the U.S. Treasury bond is default-free, we have l * t = 0 and ξ * t = 0, and then y * t =ỹ * t −λ * t .
In other words, the Treasury yield can be lower than the hypothetical dollar risk-free rate if it has liquidity benefits over the risk-free rate.
Price of a Foreign Government Bond
Now we price a one-period foreign government in an analogous way. Let L i,t+1 denote default loss at t + 1 on a government bond of country i, and Λ i,t+1 be the liquidity benefit at t + 1 for holding the bond. Letỹ it be the hypothetical risk-free rate for currency i.
Based on the derivation for the U.S. Treasury yield, we have
The hypothetical risk-free rate in currency i,ỹ it , is connected to the hypothetical U.S. risk-
whereρ it is the hypothetical swap rate in a frictionless market given by the CIP relationship for the risk-free ratesỹ it andỹ * it .
In practice, the hypothetical risk-free rate is not observed. Before the GFC, the CIP relationship held very closely for benchmark interbank rates, the swap rate implied by interbank rate differentials were equal to the observed swap rate. As documented in Du et al.
(Forthcoming), large CIP deviations emerged for G10 currencies during the GFC and persisted after the GFC for benchmark interbank rates and other interest instruments. Du et al. (Forthcoming) argue the CIP deviations exist due to constraints on the balance sheet capacity of financial intermediaries, and CIP deviations can be viewed as an intermediation fee that financial intermediaries are earning to justify the marginal cost of balance sheet capacity while providing currency hedging. Therefore, we let the hypothetical swap rate in a frictionless marketρ it be the sum of the observed ρ it and an intermediation spread τ t :
where τ t measures the mispricing of the swap rate due to swap market frictions.
Therefore, we can write the foreign government bond yield as
Once again, if the foreign government bond is default-free, we have l it = 0 and ξ it = 0, so y it =ỹ * t + (ρ it + τ t ) − λ it . The foreign yield can differ from the dollar risk-free rate due to currency risk and the liquidity benefit. 
Decomposition
The U.S. Treasury Premium, denoted by Φ, can be decomposed as follows:
wherex ≡ x * − x. We assume that the difference in the covariance between currency and liquidity risk is negligible, i.e.,ξ it = 0. Therefore, the U.S. Treasury Premium can be decomposed into (1) an intermediation spread arising from frictions in the swap market, (2) difference in default risk, and (3) difference in liquidity premium.
To illustrate the effects of each component on the unadjusted premium given by Equation 3, we present two adjusted versions of the U.S. Treasury Premium,
whereΦ it is the premium adjusted for swap market frictions, andΦ it is the premium adjusted for both swap market frictions and the credit quality differential between foreign and U.S.
Treasuries.
In the absence of CIP deviations (τ t = 0) or differences in default risk l it = 0 , the unadjusted premium Φ it in Equation 3 will capture the specialness/liquidity premium differentialsλ it . If we aim to captureλ it but we are concerned about time variation in frictions in the swap market (τ t > 0), but assume that sovereign bonds in all developed countries are free from default risk l it = 0 , thenΦ it in Equation 4 will specifically capture the liquidity component of the U.S. Treasury premium. To measure τ t , we use the CIP deviations based on interbank rates as documented in Du et al. (Forthcoming) . Finally, if we adjust for time variation in the swap market and differences in default risk l it = 0 as measured by CDS spreads, thenΦ it in Equation 5 captures the liquidity premium differentialλ it .
While it may seem natural to always focus on Equation 5 as the measure ofλ it , doing so raises a number of issues. First, the question of what is driving the CIP deviations for interbank rates in the post-GFC period remains an active area of research. We take these CIP deviations as a measure of swap mispricing, but there can be different interpretations. 
Data Sources
We briefly discuss the various sources of the data used in our empirical analysis. We use Bloomberg BFV curves for government bond yields in the United States and G10 countries.
The BFV curves are fitted par yield curves based on secondary market bond prices estimated by Bloomberg. We also use Bloomberg data for yields on interest rate swaps and crosscurrency basis swaps.
Credit default swap spreads data are from Markit and are on senior unsecured creditdefault swap contracts denominated in U.S. dollars. They were obtained for the six-month, and one to 10-year contracts. Because data on the 3-month contract is unavailable, we used the six-month contract for the three-month contract instead.
We use two measures of the scarcity of government paper. The first is the ratio of nominal federal debt outstanding to nominal GDP, and the second is the ratio of nominal debt outstanding, net central bank purchases, to nominal GDP. Data on federal debt outstanding and seasonally adjusted nominal GDP are from Haver Analytics. Data on central bank holdings of domestic sovereign debt were hand collected from individual country websites.
Finally, we obtain data on policy rates and the CBOE VIX Index from Bloomberg as regression controls when studying bond supply effects. GC repo rates are obtained from
Thomson Reuters Eikon. The Bloomberg and Eikon tickers used in the paper can be found in Appendix B.
3 The U.S. Treasury Premium: 2000-2016
Main Results
In this section, we present summary statistics and a few stylized facts about the U.S. Treasury
Premium.
In Figure 1a , we plot the nominal (currency-specific) yields of our 10 sample countries at the 5-year horizon. There is wide variation in the yields of the 10 countries. In Figure 1b , we report the swap-implied dollar yields for each country, y widened. The unadjusted premium widened most significantly. This, however, is the period in which CIP for interbank rates begins to break down and U.S. and foreign sovereign CDS spreads begin to diverge. The two adjusted premia also widen during the GFC, but by significantly less than the unadjusted premium.
In the post-GFC sample during 2010-2016, we document a steady decline in the U.S.
Treasury Premium. The unadjusted premium trended down to the negative territory in 2010 with the cross-country average at -8 basis points for the 2010-2016 period. The adjusted 13 premium is more negative over that period once we adjust for CIP deviations for interbank rates with an average equal -22 basis points. In other words, if the swap rate were at the level consistent with the CIP condition for interbank rates, the U.S. Treasury Premium would become lower. In addition, since the U.S. sovereign CDS spread is lower than the average G10 sovereign CDS spread, the CDS differential adjustment brings down the premium even further to an average -38 basis points in the post-GFC period. Therefore, the decline in the average U.S. Treasury Premium in the post-GFC period cannot be attributed to swap market frictions nor perceived credit quality differentials between the U.S. and the sovereigns.
Instead, the decline in the premium is driven by a sharp decline in the relative liquidity premium of U.S. Treasuries vis-a-vis foreign Treasuries. Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviations of the unadjusted U.S. Treasury Premium by country.
5 As we can see in Table 1 , there is a large cross-country heterogeneity in the level of the premia. Among the G10 countries, the U.S. Treasury Premium is highest for Japan with the average equal to 61 basis points and lowest for Australia and New Zealand at about -25 basis points. The crosscountry dispersion in the premia widened in the post-GFC period with the mean premium equal to 70 basis points for Japan and -58 basis points for Australia.
In terms of the time variations by country, pre-GFC, the unadjusted premium and adjusted premia are nearly identical for all countries. Broadly, this remains true for Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand during and after the GFC, suggesting that for this subset of countries, variations to the unadjusted premia are largely independent of swap market frictions, or credit spread differentials. For Switzerland, Denmark, Europe, and
Great Britain, outside the GFC and the European Debt Crisis, the unadjusted premia are generally higher than premia adjusted for CIP deviations. With the adjustment, the premia vis-a-vis this subset of countries falls more precipitously in the post-GFC period, more so when adjusting for both CIP deviations and the CDS spreads. Notably, outside crises, the two adjusted series are very similar; this is unsurprising as CDS spreads are narrow in tranquil periods. figure table reports the mean, standard error of the mean based on Newey-West standard errors with a 91-day lag, and number of observations of the 5-year U.S. Treasury Premium by country, and period (pre-GFC (2000 (pre-GFC ( -2006 , GFC (2007 -2009 ), post-GFC (2010 ). Significance levels: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
G10 vs. EM Comparison
To better understand the drivers of the U.S. Treasury Premium, we now compare the measure averaged across G10 currencies, to the measure averaged across a set of 13 emerging markets (EMs). Figure 4 plots the U.S. Treasury Premium vis-à-vis G10 countries and the U.S.
Treasury Premium vis-a-vis EMs. Unsurprisingly, the average U.S. Treasury Premium vis-à-vis G10 countries is significantly lower than the U.S. Treasury Premium vis-à-vis EMs.
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In Du and Schreger (2016a), we call the U.S. Treasury Premium the "Local Currency
Credit Spread" because we argue that it constitutes a credit spread on local currency sovereign debt, and measures the risk that governments explicitly default on debt denominated in their own currency. In the context of G10 currencies, however, we argue the measure is more akin to a convenience yield. The reason for this significantly different interpretation can be seen in Figure 5 . The left panel plots the (unadjusted) mean U.S. Treasury Premium and CDS differential for the G10 countries. Other than at the peak of the global financial crisis, we see limited correlation between the measures.
7 Pre-GFC, the CDS differential is approximately zero for G10 countries, but the the U.S. Treasury Premium is positive and sizable. Post-GFC, the average CDS differential between G10 countries and the United States is positive, but the U.S. Treasury Premium is negative. By contrast, in the right panel, we make the same figure for a sample of emerging markets and see very strong co-movement between the unadjusted U.S. Treasury Premium and the CDS Differential, indicating that the premium is capturing fluctuations in default risk.
6 The included countries are Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Poland, Thailand, Turkey South Africa, and South Korea.
7 Japan is an interesting exception, as can be seen in Appendix Figure A1 . The pattern of the strong comovement between the premium and the CDS differential is quite similar to the pattern documented for individual emerging markets in Du and Schreger (2016a) . Notably, the credit rating of Japan is the lowest in our sample of sovereigns. Notes: This figure plots seven-day moving averages of cross-sectional mean premium for 13 emerging markets (Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Poland, Thailand, Turkey South Africa, and South Korea) and mean premium for G10 countries. 
Term Structure of the U.S. Treasury Premium
Next, we turn our attention to the term structure of the U.S. Treasury Premium. Table   2 presents summary statistics of the unadjusted and adjusted U.S. Treasury Premium by tenors and subsamples. Figure 6 plots the unadjusted premium by maturity. As we can see from Table 2 and Figure 6 , before the GFC, the term structure of the U.S. Treasury
Premium is upward sloping and the premia are positive across all maturities.
During times of financial stress, such as the Global Financial Crisis, we would expect to see the "flight to safety" phenomenon increase the U.S. Treasury Premium across maturities, with the increase concentrated at shorter maturities as these instruments are seen as closer to cash than long-dated instruments. This is indeed what we observe. During the GFC, the premia increases for all maturities, with the largest increases occurring at short maturities.
The cross-country average for the 3-month premium peaks close to 300 basis points during the height of the crisis. The increase in the 10-year premium during the GFC is much more subdued with the highest level only around 50 basis points.
After the GFC, the term structure remains inverted and the 3-month, 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year premia are no longer strongly correlated, nor of the same sign. Post-GFC, the 3-month and 1-year premia are positive and have been trending up; meanwhile, the 5-year and 10-year premia have been negative and approximately flat. Strikingly, the 3-month and 1-year premia begin their upward trend from nearly 0 basis points to 70 basis points in 2014.
The inversion of the term structure of the U.S. Treasury Premium also holds for the premia adjusted for swap market frictions and credit spread differentials. Figure 7 plots the term spread of the U.S. Treasury Premium, which we define as the 10-year premium minus 1-year premium, using the unadjusted premium and the adjusted premia. The term spread becomes negative for all three premium measures post-GFC.
Therefore, we find that even though medium-to long-term U.S. Treasuries have lost their specialness relative to other near-default-free government bonds since the GFC, shortdated U.S. Treasury bills still command a sizable premium. The liquidity premium of U.S.
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Treasuries have shifted from long to short maturities. This "liquidity shift" is consistent with an increased demand for high-quality liquid assets, particularly in U.S. dollars, following the GFC. This table reports 
Relationship with Other Liquidity Measures
In this section, we examine the relationship between U.S. Treasury Premium and other existing liquidity premium measures.
Short-term premium comparison
A measure of liquidity in the 3-month market for treasuries is the General Collateral (GC)
Repo-Treasury Bill spread, defined as the spread between the 3-month Treasury GC Repo rate and a 3-month T-Bill yield. Like a Treasury security, a Treasury GC repo is free of credit risk as it is secured by Treasuries. However, repos are not as liquid as Treasury bills because the money is always lent for term (Nagel (2016) ). Thus, the GC Repo-Treasury Bill spread is a measure of the liquidity of a TBill.
Since our unadjusted U.S. Treasury Premium is vis-a-vis another country, if it is being
driven by a liquidity component, that component should be a relative measure of the U.S.
Treasury market vis-a-vis the Treasury market of a foreign sovereign. The closest approximation of this is the difference in the 3-month GC Repo rate-TBill spread for the United States
Treasuries, and the foreign country's Treasuries. (Ideally, the benchmark against which the foreign and United States's Treasuries are measured should be common).
This motivates the following set of regressions to estimate the liquidity component of the 3-month Treasury premium:
where Φ 3M,t denotes the cross-country average of the 3-month unadjusted U.S. Treasury Premium; RT U SD,3M is the 3-month GC repo-TBill spread for the United States; RT EU R,3M
is the 3-month GC repo-TBill spread for the Germany ; RT JP Y,3M is the 3-month GC repoTBill spread for Japan. We run these regressions in levels and changes, and in Table 3 uses ∆ to denote the weekly change. This exercise is restricted to Germany and Japan because of lack of good data on the GC repo rates in other countries in our sample.
Results of the regressions in levels are reported in the first three columns of Table 4 and the results of the regressions in differences are reported in the next three columns. In the first regression in levels, RT U SD,3M enters with a highly significant coefficient of 1.726 and explains explains 75% of the variation in the Treasury Premium. In the second and third regressions in levels, RT U SD,3M enters with a highly significant coefficient of 1.635 and 2.362, respectively. This supports our hypothesis that when the liquidity of the U.S. Treasuries market is high, so is the U.S. Treasury Premium. The country-specific liquidity variables enter in as negative and insignificant in the levels regression for Japan and Germany. The regressions in first differences are broadly consistent with the regressions in levels, and supports the notion that our U.S. Treasury Premium is, at the 3-month horizon, a relative measure of the liquidity of U.S. Treasury bills vis-a-vis foreign Treasury bills. When estimated in first differences, however, increases the EUR and JPY GC-Repo are associated with statistically significant declines in the bilateral U.S Treasury Premium. Figure 6 plots the average U.S. Treasury
Premium and the GC-repo-Tbill spread at the three-month maturity to make clear just how closely the two measures co-move. 
RT U SD,3M 1.726*** 1.635*** 2.362*** (0 regression results of the level of the 3-month unadjusted treasury premium on liquidity measures of the country's and United States' 3-month treasury bills. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity autocorrelation spatial correlation robust with a 13 week lag. The first column reports on the regression of the 3-month, unadjusted treasury premium averaged across countries, Φ, on our measure of U.S. treasury liquidity at the 3-month horizon RT
, which is the spread between a 3-month Treasury repo and the 3-month U.S. T-bill. The same regression in differences is reported in the fourth column. The second column reports on the regression of the 3-month, unadjusted treasury premium vis-a-vis Germany Φ EU R,3M on the measure of U.S. treasury liquidity at the 3-month horizon RT Repo/T bill U SD,3M
and German treasury liquidity at the 3-month horizon RT
Repo/T bill EU R,3M
, which is the spread between the 3-month repo rate on German treasuries and the rate on a German T-bill. The same regression in differences is reported in the fifth column. The third column reports on the regression of the 3-month, unadjusted treasury premium vis-a-vis Japan Φ JP Y,3M on the measure of U.S. treasury liquidity at the 3-month horizon and Japanese treasury liquidity at the 3-month horizon RT
Long-term Premium
At medium to long maturities, a conventional measure of the liquidity premium is the spread between yields on near risk-free agency debt and Treasuries from the same country. For the United States, this is the spread between yields on Refcorp coupon strips and Treasury strips, which are both guaranteed by the U.S. government and subject to the same taxation (Negro et al., 2017; Fleckenstein et al., 2014) . The time series behavior of the Refcorp-Treasury spread differs substantially from the cross-country average U.S. Treasury Premium as can be seen in Figure 9 . Most strikingly, during and after the GFC, the two measures have opposite signs. This difference highlights how our measure is different from those in the literature.
Our measure is an inter -sovereign measure that measures the specialness of U.S. Treasuries relative to other sovereigns whereas the Refco-Treasury spread is an intra-sovereign measure that measures the Treasury spread relative to government-guaranteed debt.
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We conduct an exercise similar to the Repo-Tbill regressions at the 3-month tenor, but -for long-term bonds. In addition to looking at the Refcorp-Treasury spread, we look at the comparable analogues for European and Japan with their agency-sovereign spread. We run the following set of regressions:
where Φ 5Y,t denotes the cross-country average of the 5-year unadjusted premium and AT i,5Y,t denotes the 5-year agency-Treasury spread for country i.
We run the specifications in both levels and first differences, using ∆ to indicate weekly changes. Table 4 presents the results. The regression in levels suggests thats higher AgencyTreasury spreads in the US are associated with a higher average U.S. Treasury Premium and a higher bilateral premium with Japan. However, the country-specific Agency-Treasury spreads enter insignificantly. In first differences, changes in the US Agency-Treasury spread always enters insignificantly, although increases in the EUR Agency-Treasury spread is associated with a reduction in the bilateral U.S. Treasury Premium with respect to EUR.
Another important takeaway from these regressions is the much lower R 2 in these latter 3 regressions relative to those at the 3-month horizon in Table 3 . Whereas changes in the US and country-specific repo spreads explained 32% of the change in the average premium and 1% and 45% of the Euro and Japanese Yen premia respectively, in this case the R 2 fall to 0.4%, 5.1% and 0.1%. In other words, while the standard liquidity measures appear to capture a large fraction of the U.S. Treasury Premium at short tenors, similar measures explain very little of the variation in the long-term premia. results of the level of 5-year unadjusted treasury premium Φ i,5Y on liquidity measures of the country's and United States' 5-year treasuries. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity autocorrelation spatial correlation robust with a 13 week lag. The first column reports on the regression of the 5-year, unadjusted treasury premium averaged across countries Φ 5Y,t on our measure of U.S. treasury liquidity at the 5-year horizon AT U SD,5Y , which is the spread between a 5-year Refcorp strip and a 5-year U.S. Treasury strip. The same regression in differences is reported in the fourth column. The second column reports on the regression of the 5-year, unadjusted treasury premium vis-a-vis Germany Φ EU R,5Y on the measure of U.S. treasury liquidity at the 5-year horizon AT U SD,5Y and German treasury liquidity at the 5-year horizon AT EU R,5Y , which is the spread between rates on a German government agency obligation, and a 5-year German treasury. The same regression in differences is reported in the fifth column. The third column reports on the regression of the 5-year, unadjusted treasury premium vis-a-vis Japan Φ JP Y,5Y on the measure of U.S. treasury liquidity AT U SD,5Y and Japanese treasury liquidity at the 5-year horizon AT JP Y,5Y , which is the spread between rates on a 5-year Japan government agency obligation and a 5-year Japanese treasury. The same regression in differences is reported in the sixth column. All data are at the weekly frequency and span 2000-2016. The unadjusted treasury premium is from the authors' calculations using data from Bloomberg; AT U SD,5Y , AT EU R,5Y , AT JP Y,5Y , are from the authors' calculations using Bloomberg's BFV curves.
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Bond Supply and the U.S. Treasury Premium
In this section, we test for a relationship between our measure of the U.S. Treasury Premium and the relative scarcity of sovereign debt in the U.S. vis-a-vis the countries in our sample. We proxy for the scarcity of sovereign debt by taking the ratio of the quantity of outstanding federal debt excluding central bank holdings to seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP.
10 This analysis builds on the work of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) that finds that the U.S. public debt to GDP ratio is inversely related to the liquidity premium on U.S.
Treasuries. Because our measure is intended to capture the premium of U.S. Treasuries relative to other safe sovereign debt, we will look at the supply of debt for both the U.S. and other countries.
Our general regression framework is given by:
where log debt GDP U S t is the log of the US debt to GDP ratio at time t, log debt GDP it is the log of country i's debt to GDP ratio at time t, and X it is a set of additional covariates motivated by Nagel (2016) . In particular, X it includes the US Policy Rate (the Federal Funds rate), the country i policy rate, and the VIX, which is the CBOE Volatility Index. In columns 1-4, we estimate the regressions in levels, and in columns 5-8 we estimate the regressions using the quarter-on-quarter changes of all of the variables. In the even numbered columns, we include country fixed effects and in the odd number columns we omit these fixed effects.
In column 1 of Table 5 , we omit country fixed effects and any controls and include only the debt variables. We find that a 1 log point increase in the US debt to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.72 basis point fall in the U.S. Treasury Premium. By contrast, a 1 log point increase in the foreign country debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 0.29 basis point higher U.S. Treasury Premium. Therefore, the initial specification is consistent with the idea that the relative supply of government debt affects the U.S. Treasury Premium. In column 2, we include country fixed effects and the effect of the individual country debt/GDP ratio disappears. In other words, the coefficient in column 1 is driven by differences in between country means. In columns 3 and 4, we rerun the regressions in columns 1 and 2 but include the additional covariates. The US policy rate and VIX enter statistically significantly-the latter result being consistent with 'flight to safety' to U.S. Treasuries during times of high global risk aversion. The coefficient on the US debt-to-GDP ratio is quantitatively similar across specifications. In columns 5-8, we estimate the same regressions in first differences and examine whether changes in the debt GDP levels are associated with changes in the U.S.
Treasury Premium. One potential concern with these regressions is that quarterly changes in debt ratios can be quite noisy. Indeed, the results of these regression are qualitatively similar to columns 1-4, but the standard errors are much larger and many of the coefficients lose statistical significance.
Taken together, these regressions show that the U.S. Treasury Premium co-moves with the relative supply of government debt, which suggests downward sloping demand functions for these debt securities. When the supply of U.S. Treasuries becomes higher or the supply of foreign government bonds becomes lower, the value that investors assign to the liquidity and safety premia of U.S. Treasuries relative to foreign bonds becomes lower. is the ratio of the country's federal debt, net central bank holdings, to nominal GDP and the variable log debt GDP U S t is the ratio of the United States' federal debt, net central bank holdings, to nominal GDP. The variable Policy Rate is the country-specific policy rate, the variable U.S. Policy Rate is the U.S. policy rate-the Federal Funds rate, and the VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index. All data are at the quarterly frequency and span 2000-2016. The unadjusted treasury premium is from the authors' calculations using data from Bloomberg. Data on federal debt and nominal GDP are from Haver Analytics; data on central bank holdings of domestic debt are from national websites; data on policy rates and the VIX are from Bloomberg. Significance levels: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Conclusion
We construct a new measure of the specialness of U.S. Treasuries relative to other near default-free foreign government bonds. We find that prior to the Global Financial Crisis, U.S.
Treasuries were quite special and earned a 21 basis point premium at the five-year horizon. (pre-GFC (2000 (pre-GFC ( -2006 , GFC (2007 -2009 ), post-GFC (2010 ). Significance levels: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 figure table reports the mean, standard error of the mean based on Newey-West standard errors with a 91-day lag, and number of observations of the 5-year U.S. Treasury Premium adjusted for CIP deviations in LIBOR and CDS differentials by country, and period (pre-GFC (2000 (pre-GFC ( -2006 , GFC (2007 -2009 ), post-GFC (2010 ). Statistics are not reported for Switzerland (CHF) for 2000-2006 because of lack of data on CDS spreads. Significance levels: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. of the level and differences of the 5-year unadjusted treasury premium on country level and U.S. variables that proxy for the scarcity of government bonds. Heteroskedasticity autocorrelation spatial correlation robust standard errors were used with a 8 quarter lag. The variable log debt GDP it is the ratio of the country's federal debt to nominal GDP and the variable log debt GDP U S t is the ratio of the United States' federal debt to nominal GDP. The debt/GDP measures include central bank purchases. The variable Policy Rate is the country-specific policy rate, the variable Policy Rate U SD is the U.S. policy rate, and the VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index. All data are at the quarterly frequency and span 2000-2016. The unadjusted treasury premium is from the authors' calculations using data from Bloomberg. Data on federal debt and nominal GDP are from Haver Analytics. Significance levels: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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